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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
TRUSTS & TRUSTEES-PRINCIPAL & INCOME-DIVIDENDS-PREFERRED
TENANT & REMAINDERMEN
-APPORTIONMENT-LIFE
RESTATEMENT

STOCK

OF TRUSTS

Mrs. Fisher died in 1938 after providing by her will that a portion of
her residuary estate should be held in trust for her daughter for life, then for
her grandson for life, with remainder to various other grandchildren. The
first life tenant died in 1939. Among the assets awarded to the trustee were
97 shares of 7% cumulative preferred stock of the Crucible Steel Company
of America, par $100 with liquidation preference of $100 plus accumulated
unpaid dividends, On July 1, 1940, the Company was in arrears in dividends in the amount of $40.75 per share on its outstanding preferred
shares. No dividend had been paid on the common stock for some
time and there was no immediate prospect of a resumption of dividends on
such stock for a considerable time as all of the preferred dividends were required to be paid first. At that date, the earned surplus account showed a
deficit of $29,187,889.26. A month later the board of directors of the company submitted a plan to its common and preferred stockholders, one of the
avowed objects of which was to "take care of accumulative dividends on the
7% preferred stock," which plan called for a merger of the company with
its principal subsidiary, the Pittsburgh Crucible Steel Company. Each common
share of the old company of $100 par value was to be exchanged for a common share of the continuing corporation with no par value but with a stated
value of $25. Each preferred share of the old company was to be exchanged
for 1.4 shares of 5o cumulative preferred stock of the continuing corporation,
par value of $1.00 per share, redeemabl'e at $110 per share at the option
of the corporation and entitled to a preference on involuntary dissolution of $100 per share and on voluntary dissolution of $110 per share
plus the accumulated dividend in either event. Thus, satisfaction of the accumulated dividends on the old preferred stock was to be accomplished by capital
contribution from the common stockholders of the old corporation so that there
was no impairment of the par value of the preferred stock and a substantial
earned capital surplus was in this manner created. By the effectuated merger,
the trustee received 135.8 shares of the preferred stock of the new or continuing corporation in exchange for 97 shares in the old corporation. During
the following three months, the trustee sold these new shares for a total sum
of $11,982.43, or an average price of $88.23 per share. When the trustee
filed his account, he treated the entire proceeds of the sale of this stock as
principal. The present life tenant filed exceptions, claiming that he was entitled to that part of the proceeds which represented the accumulated dividends
on the old shares. The court below held that the whole sum was properly
assigned to principal on the ground that nothing had taken place within the
corporation or the trust estate which would entitle the life tenant to participate
in the distribution as there had been merely a merger of two corporations and
since the additional preferred shares arose from contributed capital rather than
income. The present life tenant appealed. Held: that the shares of the

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

new preferred stock, or the proceeds therefrom, received by a trustee in discharge of accumulated dividends on the old preferred stock should be considered as income, payable to the life tenant of the trust. Fisher's Estate, 344
Pa. 607 (1942).
The question raised in this case is the right to apportionment of the proceeds of a sale of cumulative preferred stock of a corporation among successive
life tenants and remainderman in a testamentary trust, and is one of first impression in Pennsylvania. Under the Massachusetts Rule of Apportionment
it is clear that such proceeds from cumulative preferred stock are not apportionable, since even extraordinary cash dividends are treated as wholly income.
Collidge v. Grant, 251 Mass. 352. Under the Pennsylvania Rule it has been
held that cumulated preferred dividends are to be treated as ordinary and
not extraordinary dividends and are, therefore, allocated to income. This is
especially true where the dividends are regularly declared and paid. Crozer's
Estate, 27 D. & C. 179. In Thompson v. New York Trust Co., 181 N.Y.S.
956, it was held that accumulated dividends on preferred shares paid during
the period of the trust are ordinary dividends and belong to the life tenant
during whose life they are declared whether or not they are paid out of earnings of the corporation accruing during the period of a trust or prior thereto.
See, Matter of Palmer, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 833. This rule has been approved by
the Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 236, comment (o). This was the view approved by the court in the case above, although there is contrary foreign authority under the same Pennsylvania rule. See, Heyn v. Fidelity Trust, 174
Md. 639; 2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 236.8.
Under the view of the principal case, the fact that dividends have accumulated prior to the creation of the trust adds nothing to the intact value of
the corpus. The intact value is prima facie book value, which, in turn, is
ordinary par, considered as of the time the testator dies, where the income
of the trust estate is paid to life tenants with remainder over. Waterhouse's
Estate, 308 Pa. 422; Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; Baird's Appeal, 299 Pa. 39,42.
Moreover, where stock that produces income owned by the trust estate is sold
for a price greater than the intact value and such greater price is due to an
accumulation of income, the proceeds are apportionable, i. e., so much of the
proceeds as are necessary to preserve the intact value goes to the trustees for
the corpus, and the balance goes to the life tenant. Flaccus' Estate, 283 Pa.
185; McKeown's Estate, 263 Pa. 78; Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441. The
moving doctrine of equality, moreover, comes into play, that being that the
remainderman cannot be enriched at the expense of the life tenant, and if
there is a liquidation of the holdings of the trust by sale, the beneficiaries
must receive the earnings accumulated after the inception of the trust and
represented in the sale price received. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457; Cassatt's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 14.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the testator intended that any
accumulated dividend when paid during the life tenancy would inure to the
life tenant, the primary object of his bounty. Ordinary dividends, as the
present ones are considered, must go in their entirety to the person entitled
to them at the date of their declaration. Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 1), 327 Pa.
160, 165. Thus, the capital is in no way impaired, and, ordinarily, the intact
value of cumulative preferred shares is par value, the 38.8 new 5 % preferred
shares, received by the trustee as representing the accumulated preferred dividends on the old pre-merger corporation's 7% perferred, will belong to the
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life tenant as income, as though such were merely ordinary dividends. It should
be noted that this case supplements the four situations where the life tenant
is entitled to an apportionment as set out in Buist's Estate, 297 Pa. 537.
The court went on to state that section 22 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917,
P.L. 447 has no application to the apportionment of dividends with relation
to the date of the death of the testator; nor is it applicable to a distribution,
which, while the equivalent of a dividend, is not paid regularly. Given's
Estate, 323 Pa. 456.
Thus, the rule which may be considered as rooted in this decision may
be stated as follows: accumulated dividends on preferred shares paid during the
period of the trust are ordinary dividends and belong to the life tenant during
whose life they are declared, whether or not pai out of earnings of the
corporation accruing during the period of the trust or prior thereto.
W.D.B.

INSOLVENT

CORPORATIONS-BORROWING

MONEY

To

PAY DIVIDENDS

The Hotel Pennsylvania, Inc. was a corporation operating a hotel in Bedford,
Pennsylvania. All the common stock was owned by Gere C. West and his wife,
except for one share owned by an employee. These three were the directors of
the corporation and West was the manager of the hotel. There was an issue of
preferred stock outstanding, and by the terms of the issue, the preferred stockholders were entitled to vote after default of payment of two semi-annual dividends thereon. During the depression years, the hotel was losing money and the
capital of the corporation became very much impaired. In order to pay these
preferred dividends, and thus retain control of the corporation, Gere C. West
advanced several thousand dollars to the corporation. This advancement was
entered upon the minutes of the corporation as follows, "to be entered in the
receipts of the Rooms Account as a contribution." Over a year later, by resolution
of the directors, a judgment note was executed and delivered to West in the
amount of these advancements. West then entered judgment against the corporation on the note. The next year, the preferred stockholders did not receive dividends and they assumed control as per terms of the issue. The preferred stockholders elected a new board of directors and caused the corporation to go into
voluntary bankruptcy. A plan of corporate reorganization was approved without
prejudice to the claim of West. The trustee in bankruptcy obtained a rule to open
this judgment and West appealed. Held: the judgment was properly opened.
West, for use of West v. Hotel Pennsylvania, Inc., 25 A. (2d) 593.
It is established law that a director may become a creditor of a corporation,
in the absence of fraud or bad faith, and may loan money to it when needed for
the corporation's benefit, if the transaction is open and free from blame. Twin
Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 236 L. Ed. 328. But since West, as president and director of the hotel corporation, and as manager of the hotel itself,
completely dominated its affairs, his acts were subject to close scrutiny by the
courts. Taylor v. Penrose M. Co., 101 Pa. Super. 486. Here West's motive in
making the loan was to keep control of the corporation in his own hands and
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forestall the assumption of control by the preferred stockholders, rather than to
benefit the corporation, and therefore his action in becoming the creditor of the
corporation was improper.
Also, a corporation may pay dividends only out of the net profits of the corporation, and may not make any dividend payment that will impair the capital of the
corporation. Act of May 23, 1913, P.L. 336; 15 P.S. 631. Gillingham v. Frank
Gillinghanm & Son Co., 260 Pa. 559, 103 A. 991.

When the capital of a cor-

poration is impaired, its 'earnings belong to its creditors, This rule effectively
prevents payment of dividends on any class of stock unless there is some net profit,
over and above all liabilities from which dividend payments may be made. Levin
t,. Pittsburgh United Corp., 330 Pa. 457, 199 A. 332, 338; Cornell v. Seddinger,

237 Pa. 389, 85 A. 446. While it is true that under certain conditions a corporation may borrow money to pay dividends, this may be done only where there
is a surplus of assets over liabilities. Thus the usual case in which such a loan
would be proper occurs when the cash earnings have been put back into the business, or where the assets of the corporation are "frozen." Here, however, there
was no surplus of any kind and no dividend should have be'en declared at all,
a fortiori borrowing money to make such a dividend payment was wrongful. If
such dividends are illegally declared, the directors who authorized their payment
are personally liable to the company for the amount of such dividends paid out,
and recovery may be enforced by the trustee in bankruptcy in the interest of the
creditors. Branch. Trustee, v. Kai.rer, 291 Pa. 543, 140 A. 498; Cornell v. Seddin ger, supra. Thus, the rule to open judgment was properly made absolute by
the lower court.
R. W. McW.

FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE-APPLICATION

To

GIFTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

The will of T who died in 1930, provided, inter alia, after creating an active
trust in certain personal property: A. $10,000 annually to testator's wife during her
lifetime. B. The remainder of the income shall be paid to my son, R T, until the
termination of the trust. The trust was to continue for 10 years after T's death
but not until the death of the widow should she live longer than 10 years. Upon
termination of the trust, the principal fund and any accumulated income shall be
paid to my son, R T, to be his, his heirs and assigns forever. The will continuedthat in the event that R T should die before the termination of the trust, the
income and principal shall be paid to such persons as R T may in his last will
direct and in default of appointment, then such income and principal shall go
to the heirs at law of R T. The wife and children of R T, the widow of T being
still living, claimed as "persons interested" in the property under section 48 of
the Fiduciaries Act. Held: the Rule in Shelley's Case applied by analogy and R.
T's wife and children had no interest in T's estate. Thorne's Estate, 334 Pa.
503 (1942).

The case was decided under a will which became effective before the passage
of the Act of 1935, P.L. 1013, 20 PS 229, limiting the operation of the Rule in

DICKINSON LAIV REVIEW

forestall the assumption of control by the preferred stockholders, rather than to
benefit the corporation, and therefore his action in becoming the creditor of the
corporation was improper.
Also, a corporation may pay dividends only out of the net profits of the corporation, and may not make any dividend payment that will impair the capital of the
corporation. Act of May 23, 1913, P.L. 336; 15 P.S. 631. Gillingham v. Frank
Gillinghanm & Son Co., 260 Pa. 559, 103 A. 991.

When the capital of a cor-

poration is impaired, its 'earnings belong to its creditors, This rule effectively
prevents payment of dividends on any class of stock unless there is some net profit,
over and above all liabilities from which dividend payments may be made. Levin
t,. Pittsburgh United Corp., 330 Pa. 457, 199 A. 332, 338; Cornell v. Seddinger,

237 Pa. 389, 85 A. 446. While it is true that under certain conditions a corporation may borrow money to pay dividends, this may be done only where there
is a surplus of assets over liabilities. Thus the usual case in which such a loan
would be proper occurs when the cash earnings have been put back into the business, or where the assets of the corporation are "frozen." Here, however, there
was no surplus of any kind and no dividend should have be'en declared at all,
a fortiori borrowing money to make such a dividend payment was wrongful. If
such dividends are illegally declared, the directors who authorized their payment
are personally liable to the company for the amount of such dividends paid out,
and recovery may be enforced by the trustee in bankruptcy in the interest of the
creditors. Branch. Trustee, v. Kai.rer, 291 Pa. 543, 140 A. 498; Cornell v. Seddin ger, supra. Thus, the rule to open judgment was properly made absolute by
the lower court.
R. W. McW.

FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE-APPLICATION

To

GIFTS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

The will of T who died in 1930, provided, inter alia, after creating an active
trust in certain personal property: A. $10,000 annually to testator's wife during her
lifetime. B. The remainder of the income shall be paid to my son, R T, until the
termination of the trust. The trust was to continue for 10 years after T's death
but not until the death of the widow should she live longer than 10 years. Upon
termination of the trust, the principal fund and any accumulated income shall be
paid to my son, R T, to be his, his heirs and assigns forever. The will continuedthat in the event that R T should die before the termination of the trust, the
income and principal shall be paid to such persons as R T may in his last will
direct and in default of appointment, then such income and principal shall go
to the heirs at law of R T. The wife and children of R T, the widow of T being
still living, claimed as "persons interested" in the property under section 48 of
the Fiduciaries Act. Held: the Rule in Shelley's Case applied by analogy and R.
T's wife and children had no interest in T's estate. Thorne's Estate, 334 Pa.
503 (1942).

The case was decided under a will which became effective before the passage
of the Act of 1935, P.L. 1013, 20 PS 229, limiting the operation of the Rule in

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Shelley's Case in Pennsylvania. In such a case, decided after the passage of a
statute which is intended to bring the interpretation of intention into accord
with an intention that the legislature feels has been the intention of testators for
some years past, courts are very liberal, usually, in reaching the same result that
would have been reached had the statute applied, even though the facts arose
before the statute. See, for example, Mitinger's Estate, 132 Pa. Super. 475,
1 A. (2d) 572 (1938). The principal case evinces no such liberality of interpretation.
The basic method used to decide what interests are created in personal
property gifts in situations to which the Rule in Shelley's Case might have applied
had the gift been realty, has been to determine what the result would have been
had the gift been of realty. But, the courts frequently refuse to apply the Rule
in Shelley's Case by analogy because they find what they consider a better guide
to the intention than the analogy. Dull's Estate, 217 Pa. 358, 66 A. 567 (1907).
If the Rule in Shelley's Case, which frustrates the real intention of the modern
testator, would not be applied if the gift were of realty, it is axiomatic that
it will not be applied by analogy to the gift of personalty. Bacon's Appeal, 57
Pa. 504 (1868).
If this had been a gift of realty, would the Rule in Shelley's Case have
been applied, properly? Ignoring the argument that the gift here to the heirs
of the life tenant pur autre vie was properly an executory interest and that the
Rule applies only when the gift is of a remainder, (see Simes, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, Sec. 120 and 154) still the Rule would not have been applied
had the gift been of realty. It has been conceded for centuries past
that the Rule will not apply where the life estate is an equitable one and the
remainder (so-called here) is a legal one although courts are not in harmony
on the reason for this rule. Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. 504 (1868) and Simes,
Sec. 125. Here the life interest in the income was equitable clearly, the trustees
being given the duties of investment, etc. and payment over of net income to
the beneficiaries. But the gift of principal to the contingent remaindermen
(so-called) was just as clearly an outright legal interest. The principal was
to be paid over at the end of the trust. Pennsylvania has held always that
a duty of conveyance or payment is not sufficient to make the interest an
equitable one. Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. 504, (1868).
Hence, were the gift of realty, the Rule in Shelley's Case would not have
been applied. It follows that the court was in error in applying it by analogy
here, thus destroying the contingent gift to the heirs. As a common sense
construction, the result is equally erroneous. The court's interpretation makes
the entire provision in regard to the power of appointment and the gift to the
heirs should R T die during the continuance of the trust not having exercised
the power of appointment, meaningless, useless surplusage. Language should
not be so construed unless such construction is inescapable. The wife and children were holders of a contingent interest in the property. See, for another
possible justification of the present decision but in no way suggested by the
court, Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, Sec. 157.
H. S. I.
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-EMPLOYEES

'NECESSARY To THOSE ENGAGED IN SUCH COMMERCE

An action was brought by the operator of a passenger elevator and a
janitor against the defendant owner of an office building wherein plaintiffs
alleged they were entitled to the benefit of wage and hour provisions under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. 206, 207 et seq. Under
Sec. 6 of the Act an employer must pay prescribed minimum wages "to each
of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce," and under Sec. 7 overtime compensation must be given "any of
his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce." The plantiffs were employed by the owner of the building, which
building was occupied by professional and business men. A substantial part
of the business of a considerable portion of these tenants of said building was
connected with interstate transactions, but no goods were manufactured and
no tangible physical merchandise was sold, shipped, or delivered in interstate
commerce. It was conceded, for the purpose ot the controversy, that a large
number of tenants in said building were engaged in interstate commerce, as
distinguished from the production of goods for commerce and as distinguished
from the shipment, sale, or delivery of "merchandise" in interstate commerce.
The plaintiffs' services were rendered to the tenants whose business was solely
intrastate as well as to tenants whose business included interstate transactions
without regard to the type of business engaged in by the tenants. The elevator
transported messages to and from tenants as well as packages coming from
outside the state or going outside the state; likewise the elevator carried tenants
and customers, some of whose business may have been substantially interstate.
The janitor performed the usual duties of keeping the offices clean. Held:
that plaintiffs were not "engaged in interstate commerce" nor in the "production of goods for commerce" within the Fair Labor Standards Act, supra.
Cochran v. Florida National Building Corporation, 45 F. Supp. 830.
The above Circuit Court decision was rendered in the light of an earlier
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the cases of A. B, Kirschbaum
v. Walling, Administrator, and Arsenal Building Corporation v. Walling, Addecided on June 1,
ministrator, 62 S. Ct., Rep. 1116, 1117, 86 L. Ed.-,
1942. In the Kirschbaum case the employees-elevator operators, firemen,
watchmen, porters, electrician, engineer, and carpenter-were employed by the

owners of loft buildings in which large quantities of goods for interstate commerce were produced by the tenants, who for the most part manufactured, and
purchased and sold clothing and garments. The employees performed the
customary duties of maintaining a loft building, that of operating elevators,
keeping the building clean and habitable, furnishing heat and maintaining
other facilities commonly used by the tenants. Held: the employees were
engaged in an occupation "necessary" to the "production of goods for commerce" and were therefore entitled to the benefit of wage and hour provisions

of the Fair Labor Standards Act, supra.
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The Supreme Court, in determining the scope of the Act, pointed out that
Congress may choose to regulate only part of what it constitutionally can regulate. The history of Congressional legislation shows regulation not only of
interstate commerce as such, but also activities intertwined with it, as in the
case of Congressional control over rates of intra-state carriers which "affect"
interstate commerce. See Shepard v. Northern Pac. R. Co., C.C., 184 F. 765;
Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v,Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729,
57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A., N.S., 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 18; Houston, E. &
V. Texas R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341;
Railroad Comm. of State of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 257 U. S.
563, 42 S.Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, 22 A.L.R. 1086. Also the amendment of
August 11, 1939, to the Federal Employers Liability Act, extended the scope
of the act to employees who "shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect" interstate commerce, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. The
Court pointed out that the Fair Labor Standards Act is not so broad in scope
as some other Congressional legislation and is not co-extensive with the limits
of the power of Congress over commerce, but is limited to those employees
coming within the wording "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce." Sec. 3 (j) in defining terms of the Act states that "an employee
shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed in ..., or in any process or occupation necessary to the
production thereof, in any State." As concerns the employees in th'e Kirschbaum
case the Court said, "Without light and heat and power the tenants could not
engage, as they do, in the production of goods for commerce. The maintenance
of a safe and habitable building is indispensible to that activity." The Court
therefore held that the employees were engaged in an occupation necessary to
the production of goods for commerce and were therefore entitled to the benefit
of wage and hour provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the Act.
In Cochran v. Florida National Building Corporation, supra, the Circuit
Court, in considering the Kirschbaum case, distinguished the situation where
employees maintained a building the tenants of which were "engaged in interstate commeree," from the Kirschbaum case where the employees maintained buildings the tenants of which were "engaged in the production
of goods for commerce."
The Circuit Court said that the Kirschbaum decision was "supported by reason and by wording of the statute in question,"
in that the employees "were engaged in a 'process or occupation necessary to
the production' of goods for commerce." Although sec. 3 (j) of the Act defines
"engaged in the production of goods" the Act does not define "engaged in commerce" in so many words. Sec 3(b) defines "commerce" as meaning "trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several
States or from any State to any place outside thereof." There would seem to
be no logical reason for including within the Act employees necessary to produce goods for commerce, and excluding employees necessary to en gage in
commerce. The Circuit Court apparently applied the same test to "necessity,"
for the Court stated, "It would be a stretch of the imagination to say that an
elevator operator or a janitor is necessary to the sale of insurance or the sale
of bonds or the sale of stock, or in any selling enterprise of interstate commerce," as was carried on by the tenants of the building. But it would seem
that the employees in the Cochran case were just as necessary, important, and
indispensible to th'e carrying on of interstate commerce in the office building
so as to be "engaged in commerce," as were the employees in the Kirschbaum
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case necessary, important, and indispensable to the production of goods so as
to be "engaged in the production of goods for commerce." In both cases the
activity o the tenants of the buildings would have been virtually impossible
without the services of the maintenance employees. In the light of the Kirschbaum case, it is difficult to justify the decision of the Circuit Court.
W. R. E.

